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INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has, on at least
three recent and significant occasions, reversed a district court's order denying a
criminal defendant's motion to suppress evidence and found that the underlying
law enforcement action was constitutionally unreasonable. Read together, these
cases could provide insight into how a changing Fourth Circuit examines the
constitutional reasonableness of law enforcement action when it reviews a
motion to suppress.
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of a ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence in a federal criminal proceeding. Such a ruling strikes at the
very heart of the government's case-denial can help assure a conviction at trial
or prompt a guilty plea to the charged offense, while suppression can weaken the
government's case and result in a dismissal, acquittal, or a plea to some lesser

B.S., Old Dominion University; J.D. University of South Carolina School of Law. Law Clerk
to the Honorable R. Bryan Harwell, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina.
The author was also previously a law clerk to the Honorable G. Ross Anderson. Jr., Senior United
States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, and he worked as an associate for Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP.
1. See United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2013) (excluding incriminating
statement made during three-hour detention); United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583 (4th Cir.
2012) (reversing district court after finding police officer's visual speed estimate unreliable); United
States v. Edwards. 666 F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding search unreasonable where police officer
used knife to cut bag containing narcotics off defendant's penis).
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charge. The fact that the vast majority of motions to suppress are denied
possibly exvlains why most federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas or
convictions. Thus, any indication of a possible shift, however slight, in how a
federal appellate court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is
significant, particularly when that shift indicates a more exacting analysis of the
police conduct underlying the suppression motion.
In terms of court composition, the Fourth Circuit is surely changing. Once
regarded as among the most conservative federal appellate courts in the country,
the Fourth Circuit has recently been described as considerably more moderate.
Of the fifteen active federal judges on the Fourth Circuit, ten are now the
appointees of Democratic presidents." Six of those judges hav e been appointed

2.
See M. Jackson Jones, he Fourth Amendment and Search Warrant Presentment: Is a
Man's House Aliays His Castle?, 35 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 525, 564 (2012) ("The motion to
suppress is one, if not the most important, ex post protection available to citizens.... Once
evidence is suppressed, the government's case becomes significantly more difficult to prove.");
George C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons to Be Skeptical of
Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Drps, 38 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 47, 51
(2001) ("in the fifteen percent or so of cases in which the defendant files and wins the motion to
suppress, reliable evidence is lost and the defendant either walks free or a very favorable plea
bargain will result.").
3.
See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary
Rule, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211. 212 n1.9 (2010) (discussing the reluctance of "tial judges
to suppress evidence in all but the most egregious cases"); Thomas, supra note 2, at 50-51 (citing
Peter F. Nardulli, he Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 Am.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596) (explaining that most cases result in a plea bargain and that the
government will win as much as ninety percent of the time on a motion to suppress).
4.
See, e.g., Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some US. Courts of Appeals
More Liberal or Conservative than Others?, 45 LAW & SOCY REV. 171, 171, 189 (2011)
(explaining that "the Fourth Circuit is often singled out as particularly conservative," but finding on
the basis of a study that "popular political discourse over ideological circuits is overblown");
Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg Wnhat She Wants Using Sex Equality Arguments to
Demand Examination of the Legitimnacy ofState Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 377, 405 n1.155 (2011) (discussing how the Fourth Circuit. once considered the "most
conservative" circuit, has "become more moderate").
5.
A listing of all current and former Fourth Circuit judges, along with information
regarding their appointment, is available on the Fourth Circuit's web site. See Judges of the Fourth
Circuit.Since 1801. U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
pdft1HistoryJudges.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). A listing of the current judges is also available.
See Fourth CircuitJudges, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR TiHE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.us
courts.gov/JudgesBio/judgesnain.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Although the web site lists
sixteen judges, Judge Hamilton is on senior status. See Biographical Infirnmation: Senior Judge
Clyde H Hamilton, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://wwy.ca4.uscourts.gov/
JudgesBio!CHHii bio.htm (last visited Mar. 9. 2013). The ten Democratic appointees include Judge
Roger Gregory, wvho received a recess appointment from President Clinton on December 27, 2000.
However, Judge Gregory was nominated to the same position by President Bush on May 9, 2001,
after which he was confirmed by the Senate. See Biographical Infbrnation: Judge Roger L.
Gregory, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/JudgesBio/

RLG bio.htm (last visited Mar. 9. 2013).
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by President Obama within the last four years.6 In fact, the authoring judge of
each of the three opinions discussed in this Essay was appointed in 2010.'
Certainly, three new cases decided by a court with several recently
appointed members can hardly be called a shift in its own right. However, an
examination of these cases in light of the new composition of the Fourth Circuit
indicates the beginning of a possible shift wherein the Fourth Circuit may be
more exacting when reviewing motions to suppress and examining whether the
underlying conduct of law enforcement officers comports with the Fourth
Amendment. At a minimum, the cases are instructive as they offer some insight
into when a search or seizure reaches the outer bounds of constitutional
reasonableness and could result in suppression of the resulting evidence.
II. REVIEWTNG A MOTION TO SUPPRESS: CLEAR ERROR AND DEFERENCE
Before examining the Fourth Circuit's recent reversals in suppression cases,
it is important to briefly review the legal prism through which an appellate court
reviews the denial of a motion to suppress on the basis of a Fourth Amendment
violation.
"[T]he very text of the Fourth Amendment expressly imposes the
requirement that all searches and seizures be reasonable."
The existence of
probable cause, which largely depends on the facts of a particular encounter, will
typically satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 9 When
there is no probable cause, whether the search or seizure is reasonable typically
requires a court to balance the intrusion on the Fourth Amendment interest at
issue against the promotion of legitimate government interests.
If law
enforcement officers perform a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a defendant may seek application of the exclusionary rule to
suppress the ill-gotten fruits of the search or seizure.11

6.
See Judges of the Fourth Circuit,Since 1801, supra note 5.
7.
See cases cited supra note 1 (Judge Kennan for United States v. Watson and United States
v. Edwards and Judge Wynn for United States v. Sowards).
8.
United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Kentucky v. King,
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... ).
9.
See United States v. Brown, 701 F.3d 120, 126 27 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing probable
cause as it relates to seizures under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226.
241-42 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619. 2630 (2010)) (citing
Nat'i Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)) (analyzing the
constitutionality of searches under the Fourth Amendment).
10. See United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689-90 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 979 (4th Cir. 1997)); Davis, 690 F.3d at 247 (quoting Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)).
11. Edwards, 666 F.3d at 886. As the court in Edwards explained, "The 'sole purpose' of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.' Id. (quoting Davis v. United
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When a motion to suppress is filed, the district court reviews the
reasonableness of the underlying search or seizure in the first instance. On
appeal, although an appellate court reviews a district court's legal determinations
de novo, it reviews the district court's factual findings only for clear error.12
While not a "toothless" review, the clear error standard is deferential and
requires that a district court's decision be affirmed unless a "careful review of
the evidence has left [the appellate court] 'with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.'"13 Moreover, when a district court denies a
defendant's motion to suppress, an appellate court "reviews the evidence in the
light most javorable to the government.""
111. UNITEDST4TES . EDTJARDS: CU1TTNG TO THE HEART OF REASONABLENESS
Under a rather interesting set of facts, the Fourth Circuit confronted the
boundaries of what constitutes a reasonable search when it reversed a district
court's denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence in United States v.

Edwards.
In Edards, decided December 29, 2011, police had obtained an arrest
warrant for the defendant based upon his alleged use of a gun in a domestic
assault on his ex-girlfriend. 16 After placing the defendant under arrest and
handcuffing his hands behind his back, the arresting officer conducted a patdown search of the defendant.17 The arrestin officer did not find any
contraband or weapons as a result of the pat-down.
However, when other officers arrived with a police transport van, the
defendant was again searched. 19 The search took place in the street beside the
van, and the area was partially illuminated by a street light.20 During this second
search, the officers, who were all male, pulled the defendant's pants
approximately six inches away from his waist and shined a flashlight into the
front and back of the defendant's underwear.
The arresting officer spotted a

States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011)). Therefore, "For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence
benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs." Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
12. Davis. 690 F.3d at 233 (citing Ornelas v. United States. 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996): United
States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992)).
13. United States v. Wooden. 693 F.3d 440, 452 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
14. Davis. 690 F.3d at 233 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542,
547 (4th Cir. 1998)).
15. 666 F.3d 877.
16.

Id. at 879-80.

17. Id. at 880.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 881.
21. Id. at 880.
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plastic sandwich baggie tied in a knot around the defendant's penis, containing
what appeared to be a controlled substance.
The arresting officer put on gloves, and while another officer held the
defendant's pants open, the arresting officer used a knife to cut the sandwich
baggie off the defendant's penis.
The arresting officer then reached into the
defendant's pants and removed the baggie, which contained crack cocaine.2 4 At
the suppression hearing, the arresting officer gave several reasons for the second
search, including his belief that a thorough search was important as defendants
tend to hide items in their pants and that it would ensure the safety of the other
officers and the driver of the transport van.25
In his federal drug prosecution, the defendant moved to suppress the crack
cocaine, arguing it was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable search of his
person.26 The district court denied the motion after an extensive hearing, and the
defendant ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea.
On appeal, Judge Keenan, in writing the majority opinion for the three-judge
panel in which Judge Motz joined, held that the officers conducted an
unreasonable strip search "because the drugs were removed from [the
defendant's] person in an unnecessarily dangerous, and thus unreasonable,
manner."28 In reaching its decision, the majority applied the Supreme Court's
framework outlined in Bell v. TWT
olfish, 29 which requires the court to examine the
reasonableness of a "sexually invasive search" considering the following factors:
"1) the place in which the search was conducted; 2) the scope of the particular
intrusion; 3) the manner in which the search was conducted; and 4) the
justification for initiating the search.,, 0 The majority's holding rested on the last
three Bell factors.3
The majority found that the scope and manner of the search were
unreasonable because removing the baggie with a knife was "an act that could
only cause fear and humiliation,"
and it posed "a significant and an
unnecessary risk of injury to [the defendant], transgressing well-settled standards
of reasonableness." 3 It also rejected the government's proposed justification:
because the arresting officer knew the defendant was being arrested for a
handgun violation, the search was reasonable to ensure a weapon had not been

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id at 881.
Id.
Id.

26. Id
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id
Id. at 884.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Ediwards, 666 F.3d at 883 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
Id at 883.
Id.
Id. at 885.
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missed.34 The majority seemed to indicate that although the officers may have
had justification for searching inside the defendant's underwear, they did not
have justification to obtain the contraband through the dangerous method used.
Although physical contact in such a situation is unavoidable, the court noted
several alternatives to using a knife to remove the baggie, including "untying the
baggie, removing it by hand, tearing the baggie, requesting that blunt scissors be
brought to the scene to remove the baggie. or removing the baggie by other nondangerous means in any private, well-lit area."36 The majority further held that
suppression was warranted as searches akin to the one at issue fell "plainly
within the purposes of the exclusionary rule" because they were likely to recur
and should be discouraged. 3
The dissent, authored by Judge Diaz, agreed that the officers had performed
a strip search and applied the basic legal framework employed by the majority.
However, the dissent framed the action of the officers quite differently, summing
up its disagreement with the majority's conclusion as follows:
[I]t singles out as constitutionally unreasonable the use of a knife by an
officer to remove a drug baggie strapped to [the defendant's] penis, and
discovered in plain view during an otherwise lawful search.
I
respectfully dissent-not to endorse the carte blanche use of a knife to
remove contraband from a defendant's person-but because, on this
record, I do not believe that use of the knife alone rendered the search
unreasonable.39
In determining that the search was reasonable, the dissent explained that the
Fourth Circuit has long recognized that "context matters" and that the court
should not ignore the fact that the defendant was the one who chose to hide the
drugs, as the dissent delicately put it, "in a rather unconventional location."40
Regarding the specific use of the knife, the dissent rejected the notion that the
use of the knife was unnecessarily dangerous.41
In fact, the dissent posited that there was no satisfactory option for removing
42
the bag.
Three of the supposed alternatives offered by the majority involved
handling the defendant's genitals.43 "In [the dissent's] view, . . . a rule that
directs officers to place their hands on a defendant's genitals as a first option for

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
See id.
Id at 886.
Id at 886-87.
Id. at 888 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. 559 (1979)).
Id. at 887-88.
Id at 888-89.
Id at 889.
Id. at 890.
Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/14

6

Shoemake: Is the Fourth Circuit Starting to Hold Back?: Examining Possible
IS THE FOURTH CIRCUIT STARTING To HOLD BACK?

2013]

1091

seizing contraband in a baggie that the defendant has chosen to strap to his penis
seems no more attractive than the careful use of a knife."44
The dissent also found that, even assuming the method for removal was
constitutionally unreasonable, "it is not clear that suppression is the proper
remedy" because discovery of the evidence at issue was not caused by the use of
the knife.45 "As the Supreme Court has emphasized, '[s]uppression of evidence
... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse."' 46 "Put simply, the
plainly visible contraband was already discovered before the officers determined
to use a knife to remove it." 47
IV. UNITED STATES V. SOWARDS: MEASURING TRUSTWORTHINESS

The Fourth Circuit turned its attention from searches to seizures in United
States v. Sowards, decided June 26, 2012.48 In a spirited back-and-forth with the
dissent, the majority in Sowards found that a police officer's visual estimate of a
motorist's seed was unreliable and could not support probable cause for a
traffic stop.
The arresting officer in Sowards stopped the defendant for speeding based
on his visual estimate that the defendant's vehicle was travelling five miles per
hour over the speed limit, or seventy-five miles per hour in a seventy-mile-perhour zone.5 The arresting officer testified, and the district court found, that he
had been trained to visually estimate speeds.
During the stop, the arresting
officer used a drug dog to sniff the vehicle.5
After the dog indicated the
presence of drugs, the arresting officer and other officers searched the vehicle
and discovered a significant quantity of cocaine.5 The defendant moved to
suppress the drugs, arguing that the arresting officer did not have probable cause
to stop his vehicle.54 After the district court denied the motion to suppress, the

44. Id. ("Thus, while criticizing the officers' use of the knife as unreasonable, the majority
has failed to articulate a method of removal that is any more reasonable.").
45. Id. at 891-92.
46. Id. at 891 (alteration in original) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(2006)).
47. Id. at 892.
48. 690 F.3d at 583. This Essay discusses Soiwards, and to a much lesser extent its progeny
Mubdi. to showcase the Fourth Circuit's recent decisions regarding the reasonableness of law
enforcement actions in light of motions to suppress. However, the cases also discuss in great detail
when a law enforcement officer may visually estimate the speed of a vehicle. See United States v.
Mubdi, 691 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2012); Sowards, 690 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2012). For a comprehensive
analysis of these cases for the latter proposition, see Justin M. Woodard, Traffic Stops Based on
UncorroboratedVisual Speed Estinates: More (Needed) than Meets the Eve, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1101
(2013).
49. Id. at 585.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 586-87.
52. Id. at 585.
53.

Id.

54.

Id.
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defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute
.55
cocaine.
Both the majority and the dissent framed the legal standard in similar terms.
Probable cause to stop a vehicle exists if, under the totality of the circumstances,
the information known to the officer would warrant a prudent person in believing
that the defendant committed a traffic violation. 5 Any agreement between the
majority and the dissent appeared to end there. Both sides took quite a divergent
approach in how they viewed the reasonableness of the arresting officer's
conduct and whether a prudent person would believe the defendant committed a
traffic violation.
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Wynn with Judge Gregory
concurring, found no probable cause because the arresting officer, by using only
a visual speed estimate to determine that the defendant's vehicle was travelling
slightly over the speed limit, lacked "reasonably trustworthy information" to
believe the defendant had been speeding.' Chief Judge Traxler, in his dissent,
contended that the district court did not clearly err and argued that the majority
opinion had the effect of invalidating numerous law enforcement training
programs and prohibiting officers from pulling over vehicles that were breaking
the law only slightly-"a distinction this circuit has never made for unlawful
behavior." 5 The tension between the majority and the dissent in this case is best
understood by briefly examining the three major points of debate in the case.
First, the court disagreed over the relevance and reliability of the arresting
officer's training and experience. The arresting officer in Sowards, who had
more than eight years of experience as a traffic enforcement officer in North
Carolina, had on three prior occasions passed North Carolina's radar certification
process.59 This certification process entails having an officer estimate the speed
of vehicles within a certain level of accuracy. 60 Judge Traxler explained the
training as follows:
After training, candidates must pass a written test and a road-course
test. To pass the road-course test, candidates observe twelve vehicles,
'estimate their speed, and then corroborate [the] visual calculations with
the use of [the] radar,' all under the supervision of a certified instructor.
The margin of error is a combined 42 mph, or an average of 3.5 mph per
vehicle. However, the candidate will automatically fail if he varies
more than 12 mph on any single vehicle. Deputy Elliott successfully
passed the tests and received certification in May 1998, April 2000, and

55. Id at 587.
56. Id. at 588, 601. The majority specifically imposed a requirement that the officer possess
"reasonably trustworthy information." Id. at 588 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
57. Id at 588.
58. Id at 598 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting).
59.

Id.

60. Id. at 598-99.
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His certification was current when he stopped [the

In spite of this training, the majority held that it was "clear error" for the
district court to find that the arresting officer was trained in estimating vehicle
speeds. The opinion couched the officer's certification as "train[ing] to use a
63
radar unit," 6 and explained that during that training the officer was simply
"given the opportunity to 'guess' the speed of twelve vehicles." 64 The majority
specifically devoted an entire section of its opinion to expound upon this
finding.6 5 In this section, the majority held that while the training allowed an
average margin of error of only 3.5 miles per hour per vehicle, the officer was
allowed to be off up to twelve miles per hour on any one vehicle.66 Further, the
majority took issue with the test being performed on a public roadway, as
opposed to a controlled test environment.67
The dissent countered that the training specifically contained visual speed
estimation as a component and pointed to North Carolina law, which does not
allow radar use alone to support a conviction for speeding.68 The dissent also
gave more consideration to the fact that in order to pass the training at issue, the
margin of error for an officer's visual estimation of speed was 3.5 miles per hour
per vehicle. 69 Additionally, the dissent noted that the training should be
considered in light of the arresting officer's experience: ten years on the police
force, eight years of experience in traffic enforcement, and four years of
experience monitoring traffic from the exact same stretch of the interstate where
he stopped the defendant.70
Second, while on the stand, the arresting officer had some apparent difficulty
with certain measurement questions." During the hearing, the arresting officer
was unable to correctly answer questions regarding the number of feet and
inches in a yard.
The majority found that it was clear error for the district
judge to find that the officer's difficulty with measurements was immaterial to

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 599 (internal citations to the record omitted).
Id. at 588 (majority opinion).
Id

64. Id
65. Id. at 594-97 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 595.
67. Id The majority ended its opinion with a lengthy analogy to baseball, arguing that
because it is difficult for any two machines in baseball to accurately measure the speed of a fast
pitch, it is likely that the arresting officer would have at least as difficult a time, especially
considering "there are even more absolutes [in baseball] than the facts presented in this case." Id at
596.
68. Id. at 598-99 (Traxler, CJ., dissenting) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 342 S.E.2d 550. 552
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id. at 5 86 (maj ority opinion).
72. Id.
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his estimate of speed. According to the majority, the district court's "finding
rings in the absurd because one cannot discern a speed of a vehicle measured in
miles-per-hour without discerning both the increment of distance traveled and
the increment of tine passed."
The dissent pointed out that while the arresting officer did become confused
on the stand, it could either be because he did not know the answers or because
he became flustered under cross-examination and could not quickly do the
measurement conversions in his head.1 Further, in adopting a reasoning similar
to the district court, the dissent argued that "there is no evidence that the
reliability of an officer's visual estimation of speed is or should be tied to a
specific or minimum distance or time."?6 The dissent said that, regardless of the
mathematical formula for speed, as a practical matter police officers do not work
in "a classroom or a laboratory" and it is perfectly acceptable for an officer to
offer "an estimate of speed without knowing precisely the distance traveled and
time elapsed."
Third. the overarching issue in this case appears to be when, and if, a visual
speed estimate alone can ever constitute probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.
In criticizing the majority opinion, the dissent argued that it gave no explanation
as to how the district court's factual errors factored into the holding of the case.
The dissent argued that the case stands for the proposition that "as a matter of
law, a police officer can never premise probable cause solely on his or her visual
estimate of speed if the speed differential is 'slight."' 79 This argument appears to
be a fair interpretation, as the majority held that when a vehicle is only slightly
exceeding the speed limit, "an officer's visual speed estimate requires additional
indicia of reliability to support probable cause," including radar or pacing
methods.s0
However, less than two months after the Fourth Circuit decided Sowards, it
had occasion to again discuss its holding in another published opinion. In United
States v. Mubdi,1 the court held that the visual speed estimation by two officers,
who had received training in North Carolina very much like the officer in
Sowards, was enough to establish probable cause.8 In Mubdi, a majority panel
applied a totality-of-the-circumstances approach and held that even if the
defendant was travelling only slightly in excess of the speed limit, there were

73. Id. at 589.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 611 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 611 n.11
78. Id. at 610.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 592 (majority opinion). The majority seemed to indicate that when a vehicle is
speeding to a considerable degree, a visual estimate alone may constitute probable cause to initiate a
stop. See id. at 591.
81. 691 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2012).
82. Id. at 340-41 (citing Sowards, 690 F.3d at 586-87, 589-94).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/14

10

Shoemake: Is the Fourth Circuit Starting to Hold Back?: Examining Possible
2013]

IS THE FOURTH CIRCUIT STARTING To HOLD BACK?

1095

two trained officers who independently observed the defendant's vehicle and
offered similar estimates, and there was no attack on the officers' ability to
estimate speed . Judge Davis concurred in part and in the judgment and argued
that he could not "identify any material differences in the facts at hand that
[would] support a difference in outcome between this case and the outcome in
Sowards on the issue of uncorroborated visual speed estimates." 84
V.

UITED STATES v. WATSON: A SUPPRESSIVE WAIT

Like it did in Sowards, the Fourth Circuit found a law enforcement officer's
seizure unreasonable in United States v. Watson.
In this recent case, decided
January 2, 2013, Judge Keenan-joined by Judge Urbanski86 wrote the
majority opinion vacating the defendant's sentence on the grounds that the
district court should have suppressed statements made by the defendant during a
three-hour detention. 8
In Tatson, law enforcement officers observed an individual, who appeared
to be carrying a firearm, entering and exiting a building in Baltimore during a
suspected drug transaction.
The first floor of the building was a convenience
store, and three rooms on the second floor served as apparent living quarters. 89
The officers arrested the individual just outside the building, but they could not
find a weapon. 90 Therefore, the officers decided to obtain a search warrant for
the building.9 1
As one officer began preparing the application for the search warrant, other
officers be an to secure the building in accordance with established departmental
procedure.
Upon entering the convenient store on the building's first floor,
officers encountered the defendant-an employee of the store who lived
upstairs-and the store's owner.
The officers ordered them to sit down and
94
read them their Miranda
rights.9 5
It took three hours to process the search warrant application, during which
time the officers kept the defendant, along with the store's owner, in a back
room. 96 When the search warrant arrived, officers again read the defendant his

83. d at 341
84. Id at 349 (Davis, J. concurring).
85. 703 F.3d 684, 687.
86. Judge Urbanski, a United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sat by
designation on this panel. Id. at 686.
87. Id. at 687.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id. at 687-88.
93. Id at 688.
94. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. Watson, 703 F.3d at 688.
96. Id.
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Miranda rights and searched upstairs, where they found a weapon in the
When asked about the weapon, the defendant, who had a
defendant's room.
felony conviction, made an incriminating statement that indicated ownership. 98
After the district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statement,
the case proceeded to trial.9 9 A jury convicted the defendant on two counts of
being a felon in possession of a firearm. 100
All members of the three-judge panel appeared to agree that probable cause
supported the search warrant for the building, that the officers properly entered
the building to secure possible evidence in advance of the search warrant, that
the officers lacked probable cause to specifically seize the defendant, and that the
officers seized the defendant under the Fourth Amendment.101
Like both
Edwards and Sowards, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
flowed not from any real dispute about what occurred but from how they framed
the officers' conduct upon entering the building and whether that conduct was
reasonable. As a telling example of their differences, the majority and the
dissent each accused the other of advancing a new rule of law. 102
The majority opinion, looking to Supreme Court precedent, began by
explaining that even if a detention is not supported by probable cause, a valid
search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited authorit3 to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."
In one of the
Supreme Court cases that the majority cited and on which the government
relied Illinois v. Mci rthur104-the Court found the actions of law enforcement
officers to be reasonable when they prevented a defendant from entering his
home for approximately two hours while they obtained a search warrant.1os
However, the majority distinguished McArthur from the present case because the
defendant in the case at bar was not suspected of a crime when he was detained,
the officers did not have reason to believe the defendant would destrov
contraband on the premises, and the restraint at issue was more restrictive in
character and duration.106
The majority turned to the overall circumstances of the present case and
found the officers' action in detaining the defendant to be unreasonable. 10 "[I]n
'balanc[ing] the intrusion on [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment interests
97

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2006)).
101. See id. at 689. 703.
102. Id. at 694, 707.
103. Id. at 691 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
104. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
105. fatson, 703 F.3d at 691 (citing McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 694.
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against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests,"' 08 the court found
the evidence weighed "decisively" in the defendant's favor.109 The majority
framed the circumstances of the defendant's seizure as a three-hour detention of
an occupant who had no direct connection to alleged criminal activity and whose
detention lasted much longer than any "reasonable period" needed to ensure
officer safety.110 The majority, therefore, held that the defendant's statement of
ownership during that detention should have been excluded as it was obtained by
exploiting his illegal detention.
Judge Niemeyer. with "profound concern" over the majority's "alarming"
opinion, dissented.112 As the dissent saw the case, because there was probable
cause that contraband was in the building, that ongoing criminal activity was
occurring there, and that there were exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless entry, the officers had a right "to secure the building and detain its
occupants for the period reasonably necessary to obtain a warrant and search the
building."'
The dissent further relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mfichigan v.
Summers" -also invoked extensively by the majority-to delineate the
numerous law enforcement interests present in the case: a released occupant
could destroy evidence in other locations; a released occupant could return and
cause harm; a released occupant could warn others and frustrate the
investigation; and the officer would be denied the assistance of a released
occupant during the search."' In responding to the dissent, the majority argued
that Summers involved a detention after police had procured a search warrant.116
However, according to the dissent, "the principles enunciated in Summers ... did
not, in the end, hinge on the issuance of the warrant itself. Rather, the

108. Id (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).
109. Id
110. Id. at 693. According to the dissent, the majority's opinion inherently created a new rule
requiring that, absent probable cause, an individual may only be detained during the initial
protective sweep of a building. Id. at 707 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). In answering this critique, the
majority expounded that "[b]ecause our holding is based on the officers' admission that the police
had no information linking [the defendant] to criminal activity in the building, we need not reach,
and do not consider, the level of suspicion required to detain an individual in these circumstances."
Id at 694 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 698. The majority rejected the argument that there was a break in the causal chain
between the defendant's unlawful detention and his incriminating statements. Id. at 697-98
(applying the factors set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)). The majority
also held that it was not harmless error to admit the defendant's statement at trial, and vacated the
defendant's conviction and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 698.
112. Id. at 700 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 703-04.
114. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
115. Watson, 703 F.3d at 703 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03).
116. Id. at 695 (majority opinion) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702).
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culpability of the premises, the nature of the intrusion, and the law enforcement
interests implicated by the situation justified the detention."
VI. CONCLUSION: ON A PRECIPICE?

On their face, Edwards, Sowards, and TWatson would appear to have
holdings that span not much further than in cases where contraband tied to a
suspect's genitals is cut off with a knife, where an officer visually estimates
speed without radar. or where officers hold an individual for multiple hours
while waiting on an arrest warrant.1 8 While the cases would be plainly germane
under those circumstances, their holdings also reach into the core of how the
Fourth Circuit reviews motions to suppress and evaluates whether the actions of
law enforcement officers are reasonable.
In each of these cases, how the court frames the conduct appears to be a
central indicator as to whether the court will find that the conduct is reasonable.
As Judge Diaz explained in his dissent in Edwards, this is not a new
observation.11 9 To quote Fourth Circuit Judge Agee, "[p]ut simply, context
matters."120 Consider, for example, that the majority in Watson focused on its
view that the detention lasted considerably longer than the time needed to
perform a protective sweep to ensure officer safety.
The dissent, on the other
hand, viewed the detention as no longer than necessary to secure a warrant and,
in part, to ensure that a released occupant could not cause harm by returning or
by alerting others to the police presence.
This framing is of specific interest in light of the deferential standard of
review the Fourth Circuit employs when considering a district court's denial of a
motion to suppress.
The Fourth Circuit reviews the district court's factual
findings for clear error and examines the evidence in the government's favor. 1
It seems rather paradoxical that throughout each of these three cases, a panel of

117. Id. at 706 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The majority argued that the dissent's view would
create a new rule of law "allowing the police to detain citizens for a substantial amount of time,
despite the absence of a search warrant or the absence of any information connecting those citizens
to participation in criminal activity." Id. at 694 (majority opinion).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 50, 95.
119. United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 888-89 (4th Cir. 2011) (Diaz, J., dissenting).
120. Stephen Wills Murphy, Qualified Immuit Mistaken Shootings, and the Persistent
Importance of Perspective: Henry v. Purnell, 652 F 3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 63 S.C. L.
REv. 1057, 1062 (2011) (quoting Hery v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323, 337 (4th Cir. 2010), rev'd en
banc, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 781 (2011)). The en banc majority
opinion in Henry also found that a law enforcement officer's actions were unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See Henry, 652 F.3d at 533.
121. Wfatson. 703 F.3d at 693.
122. Id. at 706-07 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
123. See United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 452 (4th Cir. 2012).
124. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012).
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federal appellate court judges could not agree on how to view the evidence, yet
the court found against the government and reversed the district court.
For example, in Edwards, there was a dearth of evidence in the record
describing the knife that the arresting officer used. 126 It was entirely possible
that the knife used to remove the baggie from the defendant's penis was small, or
blunt.127 Yet the majority made what appears to be the factual finding that the
knife "manifestly" posed a risk of injury to the defendant, while it also held that
a blunt pair of scissors would have been acceptable and without problematic
risks. 128
In Sowards, the majority specifically found that the district court had clearly
erred in determining that the record indicated that the arresting officer was
trained to estimate speeds.' 1However, the dissent found the officer was trained
to estimate speeds based on the same record.1 3 0 Arguably, such a disagreement
inherently showcases "two permissible views of the evidence," which, as noted
by Judge Traxler's dissent in the case, means "the factfinder's choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous."
Do these cases, then, show that the Fourth Circuit is on the precipice of an
analytical shift? It is a matter of historical fact that the face of the Fourth Circuit
is changing.132 To what extent this change will impact the ideology of the court,
if at all, is a far more subtle and difficult question. 1 3 3 Edwards, Sowards, and
Watson seem to indicate that the court is beginning to more thoroughly examine
the reasonableness of law enforcement conduct and, thus, district court decisions
denying motions to suppress. However, only time will tell whether these three
cases are the vanguard of a philosophical transformation or are simply three
decisions that offer some additional guidance on the Fourth Amendment's
sometimes-murky reasonableness standard.

125. See supra Parts III-V.
126. See United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 890 (4th Cir. 2011) (Diaz, J., dissenting).
I27. Id.
128. See id. at 886 (majority opinion).
129. United States v. Sowvards. 690 F.3d 583. 588 (4th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 599, 602 (Traxler, C.., dissenting).
131. Id. at 610 (quoting Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 141 (4th Cir. 2009)).
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Broscheid, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing that discussions regarding the ideological
makeup of particular courts are "overblown").
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